Key Legislative and Jurisprudential Developments of Polish Antitrust Law in 2011 by Jurkowska-Gomułka, Agata
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Key Legislative and Jurisprudential
Developments of Polish Antitrust Law in
2011
Agata Jurkowska-Gomu lka
Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48546/
MPRA Paper No. 48546, posted 24 July 2013 23:57 UTC
VOL. 2012, 5(7)
Key Legislative and Jurisprudential Developments 
of Polish Antitrust Law in 2011
by 
Agata Jurkowska-Gomułka*
CONTENTS
I. Antitrust legislation
 1. Competition Act amendment
 2. Renewal of group exemption regulations 
  2.1.  Group exemption for horizontal co-operation in the insurance 
sector
  2.2. Group exemption for vertical agreements
  2.3. Group exemption for specialisation and R&D agreements
 3.  Guidelines of the UOKiK President on the criteria and procedures 
concerning a notification of a concentration
II. Antitrust jurisprudence 
 1. General characteristics of 2011 jurisprudence
 2. Entities organizing public utility services and antitrust violations
 3. Identification of a relevant geographical market
 4. Agreements restricting competition
  4.1.  Circumstances (not) excluding liability for anticompetitive 
agreements
  4.2. Price agreements
  4.3. Bid-rigging 
 5. Abuse of a dominant position
  5.1. Imposition of unfair prices and trading conditions
  5.2. Imposition of onerous terms and conditions
 6. Control of concentration
  6.1. Exceptional clearances concentration
* Dr. Agata Jurkowska-Gomułka, Department of European Economic Law, Faculty of Man-
agement, University of Warsaw; Scientific Secretary of the Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory 
Studies.
 YEARBOOK
of ANTITRUST
and REGULATORY
 STUDIES 
www.yars.wz.uw.edu.pl
Centre for Antitrust and Regulatory Studies,
University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management
www.cars.wz.uw.edu.pl
Peer-reviewed  scientific  periodical, 
focusing  on  legal  and  economic 
issues of antitrust and regulation. 
Creative Commons Attribution-No 
Derivative Works 3.0 Poland License.
YEARBOOK OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY STUDIES
192  AGATA JURKOWSKA-GOMUŁKA
  6.2.  Non-fulfilment of conditions imposed in a conditional merger 
clearance 
  7. Fines
  8.  Status of files of antitrust proceedings (administrative proceeding) 
before a competition court
  9.  Assessment of the UOKiK President’ activities by administrative 
courts 
 10.  Application of Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003 by a national 
competition authority
Abstract
The article presents key developments in Polish antitrust legislation and jurisprudence 
of 2011. Its legislative part focuses on the renewal of Polish Group Exemption 
Regulations for vertical agreements, specialization and R&D agreements as well as 
cooperation agreements in the insurance sector. Noted is also the sole amendment 
of the Competition Act introduced in 2011 which concerns the financial liability of 
the Polish competition authority. The article covers also the new Guidelines of the 
UOKiK President on the criteria and procedures of merger notifications. Presented 
in its jurisprudential part is a number of 2011 rulings, mainly those rendered by 
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, divided according to their subject 
matter with respect to particular types of restrictive practices and other problems 
related to the decision-making process of the UOKiK President. 
Résumé
Cet article présente les développements principaux relatifs à la législation et 
jurisprudence antitrust polonaise en 2011. La partie législative de l’article se concentre 
sur le renouvellement de la réglementation portant sur l’exemption collectif des 
accords verticaux, ceux relatifs à la spécialisation et R&D, ainsi que les accords de 
coopération dans le secteur des assurances. De plus, l’article mentionne un seul 
amendement à la Loi sur la concurrence. Les directives délivrées par le Président du 
Bureau de la concurrence et protection des consommateurs (UOKiK) en Pologne 
sur des critères et des procédures relatives à la notification d’une concentration 
à une autorité nationale de la concurrence sont y également brièvement décrites. 
Dans la partie sur la jurisprudence, l’article présente les décisions, surtout celles de 
la Cour suprême et de la Cour d’appel, qui sont divisées selon leur objet en faisant 
référence à des types particuliers de pratiques restrictives et d’autres problèmes liés 
au processus de la prise de décision par le Président de l’UOKiK.
Classifications and key words: abuse of a dominant position; anticompetitive 
agreements; antitrust case law; antitrust legislation; bid-rigging; common competition 
rule of the EU; group exemption; fines; Regulation 1/2003; relevant market; resale 
price maintanance; R&D agreement; specialisation agreement.
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I. Antitrust legislation
1. Competition Act amendment
The Act of 16 February 2007 on Competition and Consumer Protection 
(hereafter, Competition Act1) was changed only once in 2011. The amendment 
was introduced by Article 15 of the Act of 20 January 2011 on Financial Liability 
of Public Servants for Manifest Law Violations2. On this basis, Article 81(3) of 
the Competition Act was supplemented by an additional provision imposing 
upon the UOKiK President a duty to determine, while annulling or amending 
his/her own decision, if the original decision was in fact adopted without a legal 
basis at all or with a manifest infringement of the law. A final determination of 
that type constitutes according to Article 6(10) of the Public Servants Liability 
Act, a manifest law violation within the meaning of this Act. 
2. Renewal of group exemption regulations 
2.1. Group exemption for horizontal co-operation in the insurance sector
The most significant legislative initiatives of 2011 in Polish antitrust are 
to be found in three regulations issued by the Council of Ministers that 
establish new group exemptions for certain categories of anticompetitive 
agreements. Based on Article 8(3) of the Competition Act, they replaced 
their respective predecessors issued in 2007. This way, the Council of Ministers 
responded in affirmative to doctrinal voices arguing in favour of adopting 
new Polish group exemptions rather than replacing national legislation by 
EU regulations3. Domestic group exemptions apply to agreements having an 
impact solely on the Polish market; EU regulations apply to co-operation 
affecting intra-EU trade. However, the new Polish acts are somewhat inspired 
by EU law. In comparison to their 2007 predecessors, the detailed conditions 
for exemption and the categories of exempted agreements covered by the 
regulations remained unchanged (vertical agreements, R&D and specialisation 
agreements, horizontal agreements in the insurance sector) albeit amendments 
were made to the scope of some of these categories. 
1 Journal of Laws 2007 No. 50, item 331, as amended.
2 Journal of Laws 2011 No. 34, item 173.
3 See G. Materna, ‘Wpływ prawa UE na polskie wyłączenia grupowe spod zakazu porozumień 
ograniczających konkurencję’ [‘The impact of EU law on Polish block exemption from the pro-
hibition of agreements restricting competition’] (2010) 5 Europejski Przegląd Sądowy.
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Issued first was the Council of Ministers’ Regulation of 22 March 2011 on the 
exemption of certain categories of agreements concluded by undertakings in the 
insurance sector from the prohibition of competition restricting agreements4 
(hereafter, the Insurance Regulation). The new regulation replaced the Council 
of Minister’s Regulation of 30 July 20075 in force till 31 March 20116. Commission 
Regulation (EC) of 24 March 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the 
Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices 
in the insurance sector7 acted as a reference point for the new Polish block 
exemption. Following the EU pattern, the national act decided to cut down the 
number of exempted fields of cooperation from six to just three. The current 
Polish group exemption applies therefore only to horizontal co-operation in: 
1) joint compilation and distribution of information necessary for the calculation 
of average costs of specified risk coverage or the creation of mortality tables, 
etc8.; 2) joint research on the probable impact of general circumstances, 
external to the interested undertakings, either on the frequency or on the 
scale of future claims for a given risk and the distribution of such studies9; 
3) common coverage of certain types of risks (insurance pools)10. Co-operation 
in the compilation of information and research activities is eligible for exemption 
regardless of quantitative conditions. The block exemption for insurance pools 
created in order to cover new risks is time-limited to three years only but it is 
not dependent on market thresholds. Pools created for other types of risks can 
benefit from the block exemption if a market threshold of 20% for co-insurance 
groups and 25% for co-reinsurance is observed. The Insurance Regulation will 
expire on 31 March 2018 (a year after the corresponding EU act).
2.2. Group exemption for vertical agreements
A few days after the issuance of the Insurance Regulation, the Council of 
Ministers adopted anther act: Regulation of 30 March 2011 on the exemption 
of certain categories of vertical agreements from the prohibition of competition 
 4 Journal of Laws 2011 No. 67, item 355.
 5 Council of Ministers’ Regulation of 22 March 2011 on the exemption of certain 
categories of agreements concluded by undertakings in insurance sector from the prohibition 
of competition restricting agreements (Journal of Laws 2007 No. 137, poz. 964).
 6 See J. Orlicka, ‘Wyłączenie grupowe dla porozumień standardowych warunków ubezpie-
czenia – stan obecny i postulaty de lege ferenda’ [‘Block exemption for agreements on standard 
insurance contracts – a current state and de lege ferenda proposals’] (2010) 2(9) Rozprawy 
Ubezpieczeniowe. 
 7 OJ [2010] L 83/1.
 8 See para. 3(1) and paras. 4 and 6 of the Insurance Regulation.
 9 See para. 3(2) and paras. 5 and 6 of the Insurance Regulation.
10 See para. 3(3) and paras. 8-14 of the Insurance Regulation.
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restricting agreements11 (hereafter, the Vertical Agreements Regulation). 
Starting from 1 June 2011, the new act replaced its predecessor of the same 
name issued on 19 November 200712. The Polish legislator directly admitted in 
a document explaining its reasons for adopting a new national block exemption 
that the 2001 act follows Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 
2010 on the application of Article 101(3) [TFEU] to categories of vertical 
agreements and concerted practices13. The Council of Ministers stated that 
reference to EU law guarantees transparency – undertakings potentially 
interested in using the block exemptions do not have to adapt their agreements 
to different sets of exempting conditions. Another reason was associated with 
the fact that market conditions in Poland do not differ greatly from those found 
in other Member States and the EU as a whole. 
The scope of the Polish Vertical Agreements Regulation is based on 
Regulation 330/2010 and thus it presumes only one type of quantitative 
conditions for a ‘standard’ exemption – a market share threshold (the situation 
changes for vertical agreements between associations of undertakings or 
between undertakings being members of associations). The market share 
threshold of 30%, either for a supplier or a buyer, remains the same in both 
the Polish and the EU block exemption14. If an agreement covers many 
parties each operating on a different level of the market, all of them have 
to fulfil the market share condition15. In comparison to its predecessor, 
the new act contains an amended definition of selective distribution16 and 
added a totally new legal definition of ‘a customer of a buyer’17 (inspired by 
Regulation 330/201018). The 2011 block exemption introduced also detailed 
rules on exempting agreements between associations of undertakings and 
their members or between associations of undertakings and their suppliers19. 
Such practices were so far treated as ‘normal’ vertical agreements between 
‘independent’ undertakings; now they benefit from the block exemption only 
if they fulfil additional conditions: all association members must be retailers 
of goods (not services) and the turnover of any of the members cannot exceed 
50,000,000 EUR20. The list of hardcore restrictions (black-listed provisions) 
remained almost unchanged but the new provisions stipulate that a prohibition 
11 Journal of Laws 2011 No. 81, item 441.
12 Journal of Laws 2007 No. 230, item 1691.
13 OJ [2010] L 102/1.
14 See para. 8(1) of Vertical Agreements Regulation.
15 See para. 8(2) of Vertical Agreements Regulation.
16 See para. 3(5) of Vertical Agreements Regulation.
17 See para. 3(15) of Vertical Agreements Regulation.
18 See Article 1(1)(i) of Regulation 330/2010.
19 See para. 5 of Vertical Agreements Regulation. 
20 See Article 3(2) and 2(2) of Regulation 330/2010.
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of sales of goods to distributors outside the selective distribution system on a 
territory where a supplier operates in a selective distribution system does not 
constitute a black-listed clause21. The Vertical Agreements Regulation will 
stay in force till 31 May 2023.
2.3. Group exemption for specialisation and R&D agreements
The last block exemption issued in 2011 was the Council of Ministers’ 
Regulation of 13 December 2011 on the exemption of specialisation 
agreements and research and development agreements from the prohibition 
of competition restricting agreements22 (hereafter, the Horizontal Agreements 
Regulation). The new act replaced the identically named block exemption of 
19 November 200723. Issuing a single regulation covering both categories of 
horizontal co-operation, regulated in the EU by two separate acts, is a type of 
Polish legislative tradition. Still, the detailed provisions of the new Polish block 
exemption are patterned on the two existing EU acts: Commission Regulation 
(EU) No. 1217/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) 
[TFEU] to certain categories of research and development agreements24 and 
Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1218/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the 
application of Article 101(3) [TFEU] to certain categories of specialisation 
agreements25. The key change introduced into the new Polish block exemption 
is the broadened scope of exemption provided for R&D agreements which 
now covers, aside from joint research and development, joint exploitation of 
R&D research and a combination thereof, as well as the so called ‘paid-for 
research and development’ and ‘joint exploitation of results from paid-for 
research and development’26. The latter type of R&D cooperation refers to 
a situation where only one party conducts the actual R&D activities while 
the other party finances it. In comparison to its predecessor, the new Polish 
Regulation introduced a number of new legal definition: ‘paid-for research and 
development’27, ‘financing party’28, ‘common distribution’29, ‘specialisation in 
research and development’30, ‘specialisation in exploitation of R&D results’31 
21 See para. 11(2)(d) of Vertical Agreements Regulation.
22 Journal of Laws 2011 No. 288, item 1691.
23 Journal of Laws 2007 No. 230, item 1962.
24 OJ [2010] L 335/36.
25 OJ [2010] L 335/43.
26 See para. 3(1)(2)(d-f) of Horizontal Agreements Regulation.
27 See para. 2(7) of Horizontal Agreements Regulation.
28 See para. 2(8) of Horizontal Agreements Regulation.
29 See para. 2(10) of Horizontal Agreements Regulation.
30 See para. 2(12) of Horizontal Agreements Regulation.
31 See para. 2(13) of Horizontal Agreements Regulation.
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and ‘goods of a downstream market’32. The latter is useful when goods covered 
by a specialisation agreement are used as input for the manufacturing of 
goods on a downstream market by one or more parties to the specialisation 
agreement. Market share thresholds as a condition for the application of the 
block exemption were left unchanged but the rules on measuring market 
shares of the parties seem more precise now33. 
Unlike the 2007 regulation, certain clauses that used to be considered 
admissible in horizontal co-operation agreements were modified, mainly in 
order to make them clearer34. The list of hard-core restrictions (black-listed 
clauses) in specialisation agreements was not changed but the list of prohibited 
clauses in R&D agreements was substantially amended. For instance, the 2011 
Regulation specifies that the prohibition of using a clause on resale price 
fixing of goods extends also over the prices of the licensing processes. The 
new Horizontal Agreements Regulation broadens one of the conditions for 
joint exploitation of R&D results whereby parties to R&D agreement are now 
allowed to require compensation for giving access to R&D results in order to 
continue research or to exploit its results; compensation cannot, however, be 
excessive so as to limit or impede access to R&D results35. The new exemption 
entered into force on 1 January 2012 and will be valid till 31 December 2023.
All of the new regulations contain provisions making it possible for 
undertakings to adapt their existing agreements to the new conditions (if 
any) established in the acts of 2011 in order to maintain the benefit of block 
exemptions granted under the acts adopted in 2007.
3.  Guidelines of the UOKiK President on criteria 
and procedures concerning a notification of a concentration
Guidelines issued by the UOKiK President are not a source of binding law 
but the fact that they are published in the UOKiK Official Journal36 make 
them, to a certain extent, binding for the UOKiK President himself/herself 
(as it is stated in their introduction that ‘the UOKiK President applies them’). 
The objective of the Guidelines is enhancing legal certainty for undertakings 
regarding the duty to notify an intention to concentrate as well as other issues 
connected with antitrust proceedings in merger cases. The Guidelines cannot 
32 See para. 2(14) of Horizontal Agreements Regulation.
33 See para. 4 of Horizontal Agreements Regulation.
34 See para. 3(2) of Horizontal Agreements Regulation.
35 See para. 9(1)(c) and 9(2) of Horizontal Agreements Regulation; Article 3(2) of Regula-
tion 1217/2010.
36 UOKiK Official Journal 2011 No. 1, item 1. 
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regulate concentration-related problems in a way contrary to the provisions 
of the Competition Act; they only explain how the UOKiK President assesses 
selected problems associated with merger control. The document is divided 
into three parts: 1) criteria of notification of an intention to concentrate, 
2) notification procedure, 3) sanctions for failure to fulfil the notification duty 
and violating other concentration-related provisions.
II. Antitrust jurisprudence 
1. General characteristics of 2011 jurisprudence
This review covers selected judgments delivered in 2011 by three Polish 
courts engaged in antitrust cases: the Supreme Court (in Polish: Sąd 
Najwyższy; hereafter, SN), the Court of Appeals in Warsaw (in Polish: Sąd 
Apelacyjny w Warszawie; hereafter, SA) and the Court of Competition and 
Consumer Protection (in Polish: Sąd Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów; 
hereafter, SOKiK). According to last year’s UOKiK Activity Report37, SOKiK 
delivered 58 rulings in antitrust cases in 2011; the Court of Appeals rendered 
30 judgments and the Supreme Court only 338. 
All the judgments subject to this analysis are based on the Competition Act, 
mainly the Competition Act of 2007 which is currently in force. Some of the 
rulings refer also to practices that infringed, or at least had been declared to 
have done so, the provisions of the earlier Competition Act of 200039 (cases 
resulting from an earlier intervention by the higher instance courts). The 
article focuses on rulings delivered by the Supreme Court and the Court of 
Appeals; SOKiK’s first instance judgments are covered to a lesser degree since 
they can find themselves subject to further juridical revision, especially if they 
concern controversial issues. 
No general database exists for Polish jurisprudence that would make it possible 
to identify all judgments delivered in any given timeframe by a particular court. 
As a result, the choice of rulings assessed here was made on the basis of the 
resources collected by CARS. 
37 The Report is available in English at: http://www.uokik.gov.pl/reports_on_activities.php.
38 The data shows an increase in the activities of the Court of Appeals and SOKiK in 
comparison to 2010 – see A. Piszcz, ‘Przegląd polskiego orzecznictwa antymonopolowego za 
lata 2010–2011 (cz. II)’ [‘Review of Polish antitrust case law in 2010-2011’] (2012) 3(1) iKAR 67.
39 Act of 15 December 2000 on Competition and Consumer Protection (Journal of Laws 
2000 No. 122, item 1319, as amended).
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Not unlike in previous years, the jurisprudence of 2011 shows a clear pre-
dominance of cases dedicated to competition restricting practices – most of 
all, cases concerning the abuse of dominance. Abuses assessed by courts took 
the form of (or were alleged to have taken the form of): imposition of unfair 
prices (e.g. SA judgment of 29 April 2011, VI Aca 1171/10, ZWiK w Strzelinie; 
SA judgment of 31 May 2011, VI Aca 1028/10, STALEXPORT; SOKiK judg-
ment of 3 October 2011, XVII Ama 4/10, PKS w Elblągu; SOKiK judgment 
of 11 March 2011, XVII Ama 56/10, Marquard Media; SOKiK judgment of 
22 December 2011, XVII Ama 65/10, PGK EKOM); limiting production, 
sale or technological progress (SOKiK judgment of 17 March 2011, XVII 
Ama 227/09, Galicjanka)); imposition of onerous contractual terms yielding 
unjustified profits to the dominant undertaking (e.g. SN judgment of 5 May 
2011, III SK 36/10, ENION; SA judgment of 7 June 2011, VI Aca 415/11, 
ENION; SA judgment of 15 July 2011, VI Aca 1301/10, Dolnośląska Spółka 
Gazownictwa); discriminatory practices (e.g. SOKiK judgment of 27 Septem-
ber 2011, XVII 35/10, Sped-Pro); counteracting the formation of conditions 
necessary for the emergence or development of competition (e.g. SA judgment 
of 26 May 2011, VI Aca 1081/10, Rychwal Commune; SA judgment of 14 April 
2011, VI Aca 1084/10, Przedsiębiorstwo Usług Komunalnych in Grajewo; SOKiK 
judgment of 13 April 2011, XVII Ama 223/09, Przedsiębiorstwo Usług Komu-
nalnych w Olszynie; SOKiK judgment of 14 September 2011, XVII Ama 2/10, 
Celowy Związek Gmin; SOKiK judgment of 11 April 2011, XVII Ama 62/08, 
Telekomunikacja Polska; SOKiK judgment of 11 April 2011, XVII Ama 123/09, 
FAMIS; SOKiK judgment of 17 February 2011, XVII Ama 231/10, PZU); tying 
(SA judgment of 29 March 2011, VI Aca 1087/10, Krajowa Stacja Chemicz-
no-Rolnicza; SA judgment of 21 July 2011, VI Aca 1303/10, RPWiK w Tych-
ach); market sharing (e.g. SOKiK judgment of 31 March 2011, XVII Ama 
19/10, Horbaczewski; SOKiK judgment of 13 April 2011, XVII Ama 223/09, 
Przedsiębiorstwo Usług Komunalnych w Olszynie).
The majority of the scrutinised abuses took place on local, often municipal, 
markets including: a local market for streets, squares and public roads lightening 
services on the territory of the Bochnia Commune (SN judgment of 5 May 2011, 
III SK 36/10, ENION; SA judgment of 7 June 2011, VI Aca 415/11, ENION); 
a local market of liquid waste collection and transport (SA judgment of 26 May 
2011, VI Aca 1081/10, Rychwal Commune; SOKiK judgment of 11 April 2011, 
XVII Ama 123/09, FAMIS); a local market for waste transport (SA judgment of 
14 April 2011, VI Aca 1084/10, Przedsiębiorstwo Usług Komunalnych in Grajewo); 
a local market for the provision of water and/or sewage collection (e.g. SA 
judgment of 29 April 2011, VI Aca 1171/10, ZWiK w Strzelinie; SA judgment 
of 21 July 2011, VI Aca 1303/10, RPWiK w Tychach; SOKiK judgment of 22 
December 2011, XVII Ama 65/10, PGK EKOM); a local market for cemeteries 
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and funeral services (SOKiK judgment of 13 April 2011, XVII Ama 223/09, 
Przedsiębiorstwo Usług Komunalnych w Olszynie); a local market for bus 
transport services (SOKiK judgment of 3 October 2011, XVII Ama 4/10, PKS 
w Elblągu); a local market for waste management (SOKiK judgment of 30 June 
2011, XVII Ama 24/08, MPO w Krakowie); a local market for cable television 
and products connected to the provision of cable television services (SOKiK 
judgment of 31 March 2011, XVII Ama 127/08, Toya); a local market for timber 
sales (SOKiK judgment of 31 March 2011, XVII Ama 19/10, Horbaczewski); 
a local market of paid access to the A-4 Katowice–Kraków motorway (SA 
judgment of 31 May 2011, VI Aca 1028/10, STALEXPORT); a local market for 
the administrating and executing of a concession for the exploitation of mineral 
water from a certain spring (SOKiK judgment of 17 March 2011, XVII Ama 
227/09, Galicjanka). Some relevant markets covering a territory of more than 
one commune were not seen as ‘local’ but as ‘regional’: a regional market for 
gas distribution (SA judgment of 15 July 2011, VI Aca 1301/10, Dolnośląska 
Spółka Gazownictwa), a regional market for waste storage (SOKiK judgment 
of 14 September 2011, XVII Ama 2/10, Celowy Związek Gmin).
A few abuse cases, mainly those assessed by the Supreme Court, concerned 
practices employed on national markets such as: a market for chemical soil 
analysis (SA judgment of 24 May 2011, VI Aca 1334/10, Przybysz-Kosiady); 
a market for rail transport of goods (e.g. SOKiK judgment of 27 September 
2011, XVII 35/10, Sped-Pro; SOKiK judgment of 18 April 2011, XVII Ama 
155/09, PKP Cargo); a market for sport newspapers sales (SOKiK judgment 
of 11 March 2011, XVII Ama 56/10, Marqurd Media); a market for the 
provision of services of Internet access to final users connected to public 
telecoms networks (SOKiK judgment of 11 April 2011, XVII Ama 62/08, 
Telekomunikacja Polska); a market for the organization of the provision of 
healthcare services financed from public funds (SOKiK judgment of 20 April 
2011, XVII Ama 201/09, NFZ); a market for collective life insurance for 
employees (SOKiK judgment of 17 February 2011, XVII Ama 231/10, PZU). 
Most of the multilateral practices subject to juridical review in 2011 were 
price-related (SN judgment of 3 November 2011, III SK 21/11, Röben; SA 
judgment of 20 July 2011, VI ACa 141/11, Chemik J.D. Krieger; SOKiK judgment 
of 8 June 2011, XVII Ama 23/09, ZAIKS, SFP; SOKiK judgment of 18 January 
2011, XVII Ama 25/10, Budmex; SOKiK judgment of 27 April 2011, XVII 
Ama 44/09, Castorama; SOKiK judgment of 28 April 2011, XVII Ama 133/09, 
Hajduki and other judgments related to this agreement; SOKiK judgment of 
18 July 2011, XVII Ama 167/09, ACS Sluchmed). One practice ruled on by 
SOKiK concerned an agreement on the terms of sales of goods – a prohibition 
to resell by distributors goods purchased from a certain supplier (SOKiK 
judgment of 4 April 2011, XVII Ama 100/09, AKPOL). One of the judgments 
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concerned bid rigging (SA judgment of 8 April 2011, VI ACa 1071/10, Miejskie 
Przedsiębiorstwo Zieleni w Lublinie). 
Competition restricting agreements were scrutinised mainly with respect to 
national markets such as: a market for the wholesale of chemical construction 
materials (SA judgment of 20 July 2011, VI Aca 141/11, Chemik J.D. Kreisel); 
a market for the sale of audiovisual works on physical carriers designed 
for personal use and a market for collective management of copyright for 
audiovisual works (SOKiK judgment of 8 June 2011, XVII Ama 23/09, ZAIKS, 
SFP); a market for the distribution of drainpipes (SOKiK judgment of 18 
January 2011, XVII Ama 25/10, Budmex); a market for the wholesale of 
paints and lacquers (e.g. SOKiK judgment of 27 April 2011, XVII Ama 44/09, 
Castorama; SOKiK judgment of 28 April 2011, XVII Ama 133/09, Hajduki); 
a market for the sale of children goods (SOKiK judgment of 4 April 2011, 
XVII Ama 100/09, AKPOL); a market for sales of hearing aids (e.g. SOKiK 
judgment of 18 July 2011, XVII Ama 167/09, ACS Sluchmed). Only few of 
the reviewed agreements related to local markets such as the market for 
maintenance services of municipal greeneries in Lublin (SA judgment of 8 
April 2011, VI ACa 1071/10, Miejskie Przedsiębiorstwo Zieleni w Lublinie) 
Two judgments were adopted as appeals against decisions issued by the UOKiK 
President banning a concentration but both of the prohibitive decisions were 
sustained. One of these concerned battery recycling (SOKiK judgment of 13 
April 2011, XVII Ama 78/09, Orzeł Biały) and the other related to the production 
of railway infrastructure (SOKiK judgment of 5 April 2011, XVII Ama 213/09, 
Cogifer). Another merger-related judgment focused on the imposition of fines for 
the non-fulfilment of obligations (obligation to dispose of rights to some assets) 
imposed on the acquiring company (Carrefour) in a conditional clearance of 
a concentration (3 October 2011, XVII Ama 8/10, Carrefour). 
2. Entities organizing public utility services and antitrust violations
In a judgement of 24 May 2011, VI Aca 1334/10, Przybysz-Kosiady, the 
Court of Appeals expressed the opinion that entities organizing public utility 
services were subject to the Competition Act if due to the nature of their 
activity they could be qualified as an entity participating in the market and 
conducting an economic activity. However, State’s imperious activity is not an 
economic activity and thus not subject to competition law. Distinguishing a 
business (entrepreneurial) activity from an activity within public imperium is 
justified mainly in the context of the interpretation of Article 4(1)(a) of the 
Competition Act (containing a legal definition of the term ‘undertaking’). 
According to the Court, objectives of the Competition Act do not provide for 
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an assessment of competition law compliance of imperious activity of entities 
exercising public powers. As a result, if it is the legislator that determines the 
prices of certain services, rather than an entity fulfilling State policy tasks (e.g. 
conducting a chemical soil analysis), and the latter only applies such imposed 
prices, its activity cannot be assessed under the Competition Act.
3. Identification of a relevant geographical market
In a judgment of 31 May 2011, VI Aca 1028/10, STALEXPORT, the Court 
of Appeals sustained SOKiK’s view that a relevant geographical market could 
be described as a market for paid access to a specific part of the Krakow-
Katowice A-4 motorway. The Court noted a rule formulated by the European 
Commission that a relevant geographical market covers the territory where the 
undertakings concerned actually conduct their business. The Court of Appeals 
shared the jurisprudential view that a market defined in abuse proceedings 
could be very narrow, especially when the imposition of unfair prices for an 
individual product on an individual local market was alleged. The features 
of motorways make it so that other roads in the same area or equivalent rail 
connections cannot be considered as substitutes. The fact that in a concession 
contract other roads on the same territory were called ‘competitive’ cannot be 
binding as even parties admitted that in order to ensure the competitiveness 
of their roads with the motorway, it was necessary to increase their standard. 
4. Agreements restricting competition 
4.1. Circumstances (not) excluding liability for anticompetitive agreements
In a judgment of 20 July 2011, VI Aca 141/11, Chemik J.D. Kreisel, the 
Court of Appeals commented on arguments recalled by parties to a vertical 
agreement on minimal prices in order to justify their participation in a 
prohibited practice and to be declared ‘innocent’ of a violation of Article 6(1) 
of the Competition Act. The Court claimed that the sole fact of an economic 
dependence from a contractor was not enough to exclude the illegality of the 
activities of the parties to the scrutinised agreement. Accordingly, economic 
dependence of one party from the other can limit its freedom to act but does 
not eliminate it. The fact that a party was coerced to conclude an illegal 
agreement by another party, which used its leading market position to do 
so, cannot be considered as a ‘mitigating factor’ for the former because 
the ‘weaker’ party could have reported such a situation to the competition 
authority. Lack of awareness of the illegality of a practice does not eliminate 
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liability for competition law violations. The Court of Appeals claimed: ‘Acting 
in good faith and a conviction that an agreement does not infringe the law (…) 
is not enough to exclude the illegality of a practice’. The Court continued to 
say that undertakings often assume that a passive role in an illegal agreement 
eliminates their liability for the practice. Such circumstances can, however, 
only be analyzed in the context of fine setting. In the Court’s view, liability is 
excluded only by an active attitude of rejection of the practice (open objection 
to the participation in an illegal agreement, leaving no doubts as to the lack 
of intention to engage in an illegal practice).
4.2. Price agreements
The most important judgment of 2011 on price agreements was the ruling 
delivered by the Supreme Court on 23 November 2011, III SK 21/11, Röben. 
The Court presented therein a new approach to vertical agreements on resale 
price maintenance (hereafter, RPM). Such agreements used to be treated by 
Polish jurisprudence (and often also in Polish literature) as prohibited per se. 
The Supreme Court did not share this position, however, and claimed that RPM 
might be pro-competitive and as such, it could be subject to a legal exemption 
from the overall prohibition of competition restricting agreements. According 
to the Court, RPM may be pro-competitive if it allows a manufacturer (but not 
a distributor) to enter a new market, if it prevents free-riding and if it supports 
a short-term campaign of low prices in order to build a coherent vision of a 
sale network. The Röben ruling is said to be inspired by the Leegin judgment 
of the US Supreme Court40 and may be treated as an announcement of a shift 
in Polish jurisprudence on RPM. 
However, in a judgment delivered on 20 July 2011, VI Aca 141/11, Chemik 
J.D. Kreisel, and thus proceedings the Röben ruling, the Court of Appeals 
confirmed a strictly prohibited nature of vertical agreements on minimal 
prices. The Court even said that such agreements are per se prohibited and 
there was no need to calculate the market share of their participants. The 
judgment could be treated as proof that the Polish juridical line on vertical 
price agreements is still conservative, but this opinion is not true in the 
context of two other judgments. First, in a judgment of 18 January 2011, XVII 
Ama 25/10, Budmex, SOKiK annulled a decision of the UOKiK President 
on a prohibited vertical price agreement because of lacking evidence for the 
40 A. Bolecki, ‘Ustalanie minimalnych cen odsprzedaży – czas na zmiany. Glosa do wyroku 
Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 23.11.2011 r. w sprawie III SK 21/11 (Röben Ceramika Budowlana)’ 
[‘Resale price maintenance – time for changes. Case comment to the judgment of the Supreme 
Court of 23 November 2011 in case III SK 21/11 (Röben Ceramika Budowlana)’] (2012) 3(1) 
iKAR 107.
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anticompetitive effects of the agreement. The second ruling showing a more 
flexible approach to vertical price agreements was delivered by the Court of 
Appeals on 21 September 2011, VI Aca 240/11. It was stated therein that the 
sole fact of signing a distribution contract could not be treated as equal to 
the participation in an anticompetitive agreement. An existence of a price 
agreement should be proven without a doubt by various evidential sources 
and not only by submitting a copy of the contract. The Court stipulated in its 
verdict that the UOKiK President failed to propose any logical reasoning that 
would prove the existence of an anticompetitive agreement. The justification 
of the antitrust decision was based mainly on the statements of the undertaking 
that has in fact initiated the very proceedings.
Regarding price cartels, in a judgment in the ZAIKS/SPF case, SOKiK 
affirmed that an imposition of rigid prices is ‘the hardest violation of 
competition law’ (a judgment of 8 June 2011, XVII Ama 23/09, ZAIKS, SFP).
4.3. Bid-rigging 
Bid-rigging is commonly seen as vary harmful for competition but rather 
difficult to discover41. It is worth mentioning the criteria for assessing this type 
of practice as pointed out by the Court of Appeals in a judgment delivered 
on 8 April 2011, VI Aca 1071/10 Miejskie Przedsiebiorstwo Zieleni w Lublinie. 
Accordingly, the fact that in a tender organized by a municipality four 
undertakings submitted non-colliding offers for maintenance services for city 
greeneries and that these offers exhausted around 98% of the tender’s budget 
should be regarded as proof of bid-rigging. Contents of the offers show that 
tender participants decided on a territorial division (each of them submitted 
an offer for a different part of the city) in order to avoid competing with each 
other and simultaneously benefit from the entire available tender budget. The 
participants’ arguments that their offers covered only the city district best 
known to them could not be approved as the same companies have submitted 
offers in earlier tenders for servicing multiple districts. The Court said that an 
offer covering only one city area is not economically sound as every rational 
tender participants would consider not only its knowledge of the area but also 
other factors such as transport costs, tender value and its overall resources. 
The fact that four separate offers nearly exhausted the entire tender budget 
confirmed that the participants were not afraid of submitting bids that would 
compete with others. The Court admitted, however, that all of these arguments 
would not have been a sufficient basis for an allegation of bid-rigging if not for 
41 E. Wojtczak, ‘Zwalczanie zmów przetargowych w Polsce’ [‘Counterfighting tender 
collusions in Poland’] (2010) 7 Państwo i Prawo.
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the fact that the competition authority has proven that the participants had 
communicated with each other very intensively before and during the tender. 
5. Abuse of a dominant position
5.1. Imposition of unfair prices and trading conditions
In a judgment of 31 May 2011, VI Aca 1028/10, STALEXPORT, the Court 
of Appeals ruled on an antitrust case of high importance for the Polish public 
opinion. The second instance Court sustained a SOKiK judgment approving a 
decision of the UOKiK President which found that charging the maximum price 
provided for in a motorway access price list during the time of that motorway’s 
reconstruction (which caused many traffic disturbances) constituted an abuse 
of a dominant position in the form of an imposition of unfair prices (a practice 
prohibited by Article 9(2)(1) of the Competition Act). The Court of Appeals 
confirmed that motorway access prices charged on the basis of a contract 
between a private company managing it and the Polish State cannot be treated 
as a ‘public burden’ (similar e.g. to taxes). Instead, it is a price that can be 
analysed in light of the abuse of dominance prohibition. In the Court’s view, 
the reconstruction and modernization of a motorway results in a decrease 
of that road’s overall standard which causes the motorway to lose its special 
features distinguishing it from other public roads. An exclusion of one lane 
or a speed restriction causes a motorway to fail in fulfilling its role properly 
and thus, it is not justified to impose upon its users access charges at the same 
level as in times of no disturbances. The Court of Appeals claimed that a ‘full 
price’ can be charged only if users benefit from ‘full equivalence’ of services42. 
If a motorway operator does not provide such equivalence, it is not entitled to 
charge full prices, especially because there is no alternative motorway to the 
one under construction (the scrutinised operator is the only service-provider 
available so it abused its dominant position by imposing unfair prices).
Unfair prices can also take, in the meaning of Article 9(2)(1) of the Com-
petition Act, the form of excessive prices43. Acknowledging a certain price as 
‘excessive’ does not have to be necessarily connected to profits actually gained 
by the dominant company. The Court of Appeals asserted that an excessive 
42 On the problem of equivalen ce see Ł. Węgrzynowski, ‘Ekwiwalentność świadczeń w orzecz-
nictwie antymonopolowym’ [‘Equality of subjects of contracts in antitrust jurisprudence’] (2010) 
4 Glosa.
43 See A. Brzezińska-Rawa, ‘Nadużycie pozycji dominującej w postaci stosowania ceny 
nadmiernie wygórowanej’ [‘Abuse of a dominant position by applying excessive prices’] (2011) 
1 Przegląd Prawa Publicznego.
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nature of a price was of importance mainly for customers obliged to pay such a 
price (judgment of 29 April 2011, VI Aca 1171/10, ZWiK w Strzelinie). It is thus 
necessary to assess prices from the customers’ perspective because they compare 
the prices they pay with those paid by customers in neighbouring communes. 
In the Court’s view, if an undertaking applies very high prices and yet does not 
gain any profit from it, it means that the price has not been calculated properly 
and that the whole activity of that undertaking needs to be improved (lack of 
profit despite very high prices indicates an improper cost structure). The sole 
fact that the company at stake eliminated cross-subsidizing (which used to keep 
prices low) does not make it impossible to determine that the price at which the 
dominant undertaking arrived was in fact excessive and unfair.
5.2. Imposition of onerous agreement terms and conditions
In a judgment of 5 May 2011, III SK 36/10, ENION44, the Supreme Court 
restated that in light of its settled jurisprudence, ‘unjustified profits’ in the 
meaning of Article 8(2)(6) of the Competition Act 2000 (currently Article 9(2)
(6) of the Competition Act) are ‘profits that would have not been achieved by 
an undertaking on a competitive market’ (SN judgment of 16 October 2008, 
III SK 2/08). At the same time, an ‘onerous agreement term’ is a term that 
‘constitutes for one party of an agreement a burden bigger than commonly 
accepted in a certain types of relationships (SN judgment of 16 October 
2008, III SK 8/08). The facts of the case at hand showed that prices charged 
by an energy company (ENION) for providing energy for street lights in 
the Bochnia Commune did not cover infrastructure exploitation costs. The 
Supreme Court claimed that ENION did not enjoy double profits for the same 
service when it demanded that the Commune covers maintenance services 
costs as well. In the Court’s view, the Energy Law Act cannot be interpreted 
in a way that excludes the possibility of charging prices that reflect the costs 
of appliance maintenance, installation and networks used for street lighting. 
Simultaneously, there is no rule on a duty to cover such costs by an energy 
company. Even if paying such costs is burdensome for the Commune, it does 
not bring unjustified profits to the energy company. The Court stated that 
a rational undertaking, even one holding a dominant position, aims to achieve 
an income at least covering the costs of its functioning, including a minimal 
level of profits allowing for a reconstruction of assets.
In a judgment of 15 July 2011, VI Aca 1301/10, Dolnośląska Spółka 
Gazownictwa, the Court of Appeals confirmed a doctrinal view that a contractual 
44 As a response to this judgment, the Court of Appeals in its ruling of 7 June 2011, VI 
Aca 415/11, changed the SOKiK judgment by stating that ENION did not violate the abuse 
prohibition. 
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condition is onerous if it places on one of the parties a burden heavier than 
commonly accepted in relationships of a certain kind. Accordingly, what 
needs to be examined is if a dominant company would be able to negotiate 
a similar condition in a hypothetical situation of free competition. An onerous 
nature of a condition should however be scrutinized in the overall context 
of all provisions applied to a certain contract. The Court stressed that an 
exploitative character of a practice should be examined with reference to the 
content of the ‘imposed’ contract, not its execution.
6. Control of concentration
6.1. Extraordinary consent for concentrations
SOKiK ruled on 13 April 2011, XVII Ama 78/09, Orzeł Biały, on an appeal 
against a decision prohibiting a concentration issued by the UOKiK President. 
The Court expressed in this case its opinion on exceptional clearances for 
concentrations that can be issued in Poland on the basis of Article 20(2) 
of the Competition Act even if the notified operation was to result in 
a significant impediment of competition45. Accordingly, the legal provision on 
exceptional clearances is based on the rule of reason whereby some restraints 
of competition should be admissible if they bring about general economic or 
social benefits outweighing the operation’s anticompetitive effects. The Court 
affirmed: ‘The Competition Act should prevent only unreasonable restraints 
of market competition (also when the restraint is a result of a concentration). 
Such an assumption is related to the fact that the protection of competition is 
not the sole goal of the Competition Act [but rather] achieving certain benefits 
in a general socio-economic interest. If such benefits can also be achieved by 
restricting competition (also as a result of a concentration), activities leading to 
such restraints are not seen as prohibited by the Act’. All this notwithstanding, 
SOKiK did not approve of the benefits listed by the plaintiff in this case 
as reasons justifying the issue of an exceptional clearance (ecological safety 
of the State; interests of Polish science; improving the innovativeness of the 
economy; providing a workplaces for the employees of the undertakings 
concerned; avoiding insolvency of the recycling companies).
45 More on exceptional clearances of concentration in Polish antitrust law: M. Błachucki, 
R. Stankiewicz, ‘Decyzja zezwalająca na dokonanie koncentracji z naruszeniem testu istotnego 
ograniczenia konkurencji (art. 20 ust. 2 ustawy antymonopolowej)’ [‘Decision of the competition 
authority clearing a merger which substantially impedes competition (Art. 20(2) of the Polish 
antimonopoly act)’] (2010) 6 Przegląd Ustawodawstwa Gospodarczego.
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6.2. Non-fulfilment of conditions imposed in a conditional merger clearance
In a judgment of 3 October 2011, XVII Ama 8/10, Carrefour, SOKiK 
assessed the justification given by Carrefour for its failure to fulfil the 
obligations imposed upon it in a conditional merger clearance.Carrefour was 
obliged to dispose of its rights (ownership rights, renting rights, usufruct, etc.) 
to a number of super- or hypermarkets in locations indicated by the UOKiK 
President. Carrefour’s failure to fulfil these obligations in the specified 
timeframe resulted in a fine imposed by the UOKiK President. The Court 
sustained the decision of the antitrust authority claiming that the plaintiff did 
not prove that the fulfilment of the conditions was impossible if the company 
was to act with proper care. The Court even suggested that the company could 
have, if need be, disposed of its rights gratuitously. SOKiK stated that while 
accepting the obligations imposed in the conditional clearance, the company 
should have known that it would not find a buyer willing to pay a price that 
would satisfy Carrefour. As such, it must have considered the possibility 
that it would have to dispose of the specified rights even on a gratuitous 
basis. The Court claimed that before all the legal activities concerning the 
concentration were completed, the plaintiff has had the possibility to scrutinize 
the financial effects of the fulfilment of the conditions, and especially if the 
concentration would still be profitable if difficulties occurred in disposing the 
contested rights. According to SOKiK, the company should have anticipated 
circumstances such as falling attractiveness of the real estate on sale (resulting 
from the appearance of competitive buildings) or a general collapse of demand. 
As a result, such circumstances could not justify the failure to fulfil the said 
obligations. SOKiK refused also the argument that general knowledge (mainly 
by competitors) of the content of the decision acted as a barrier in fulfilling 
Carrefour’s obligations especially in light of the fact that Carrefour did not 
apply for secrecy of the decision. Even if, however, secrecy was requested, it 
would have been justified only in light of very important reasons because – in 
SOKiK’s view – transparency is a key idea of the Competition Act.
7. Fines
In a judgment of 21 April 2011, VI Aca 996/10 PZPN/Canal+46, the Court 
of Appeals criticized SOKiK’s positions on two facts which, according to 
the first instance court, should have been seen by the UOKiK President as 
mitigating factors in calculating the amount of fines imposed for an antitrust 
infringement. The first mitigating factor under consideration was the fact that 
46 More on this judgement see a case comment by T. Bagdziński in the current volume of YARS.
VOL. 2012, 5(7)
KEY LEGISLATIVE AND JURISPRUDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS… 209
the infringer fulfils public tasks and that worsening of its financial situation 
(because of the duty to pay the antitrust fine) would have influenced the 
accomplishment of these tasks. The Court of Appeals claimed that even if 
Article 104 of the Competition Act 2000 contained an open list of factors that 
should be considered while determining the fine amount, fulfilling public tasks 
cannot be treated as a mitigating factor. Approving such view would lead to 
unacceptable privileges being granted to entities fulfilling public tasks even if 
they violate competition rules within their economic activities. The Court of 
Appeals criticised also SOKiK’s use of the infringer’s bad financial situation as 
a mitigating factor in calculating its fine. According to the Court, seeing a bad 
financial situation as a mitigating factor for the imposition of antitrust fines 
would mean attributing an unjustifiable competitive advantage to undertakings 
that are worse adapted to market conditions. 
The Court of Appeals ruled once again on the possibility to decrease the 
amount of a fine imposed by the UOKiK President in a judgment of 21 July 
2011, VI Aca 1303/10, RPWiK w Tychach. It stated therein that a fine of 
0.1% of the undertaking’s annual income was adequate to the gravity of the 
infringement committed by a municipal supplier of water and sewage collector 
since the latter was a professional market participant with considerable business 
experience that concludes contracts mainly with consumers (weakest market 
players), so it should have acted with special care in order not to violate the law 
and infringe customer interests. The Court of Appeals shared SOKiK’s view, 
despite the fact that their opinion can be considered rather controversial, that 
a fine could be relatively small because the scrutinised practice appeared only 
locally and had a limited territorial scope. Moreover, the UOKiK President 
did not receive any customer complaints and the undertaking did not create 
any barriers for the antitrust proceeding. 
8.  Status of files of antitrust proceedings (administrative proceeding) 
before a competition court
In a judgment of 8 April 2011, VI Aca 1071/10 Miejskie Przedsiebiorstwo 
Zieleni w Lublinie, the Court of Appeals referred to a claim that an earlier 
SOKiK judgment had been based on facts established in antitrust proceedings 
even if the Polish Code of Civil Procedure does not provide for evidence such 
as files accumulated in administrative proceedings. The second instance court 
stated that court proceedings before SOKiK are contradictory in nature where 
evidence collected in the earlier administrative proceedings is regarded as 
proofs (the Court of Appeals referred to an SN judgment of 20 September 
2005, III SZP 2/05). Even if SOKiK acts as a first instance court, the fact that 
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it scrutinizes appeals against antitrust decisions causes the necessity to control 
the activities of the competition authority in its administrative proceeding. 
Therefore, all files accumulated in the antitrust procedure are to act as the 
basis for SOKiK’s activity in competition law cases. If SOKiK was not to 
examine the entire content of these files, this could be considered as failure 
to analyse the case.
9. Assessment of the UOKiK President’ activities by administrative courts 
In order to get a full overview of Polish jurisprudence in antitrust cases, 
rulings of administrative courts, mainly regional ones cannot be overlooked. 
The Regional Administrative Court in Warsaw (in Polish: Wojewódzki Sąd 
Administracyjny; hereafter, WSA) issued in 2011 a number of orders rejecting 
complaints about the activities as well as non-activity of the UOKiK President. 
The rejected claims concerned: 1) an order issued by the UOKiK President 
refusing to grant the status of a procedural party to a non-governmental 
organization (VI SA-WA 1867/09); 2) lack of information on the result of 
explanatory proceedings initiated in response to a complaint on an alleged 
competition law infringement submitted to the UOKiK President (VI SA Wa 
1131/11)47; 3) a letter from the UOKiK President stating that the authority, 
after completing explanatory proceedings, does not intend to initiate a full 
antitrust procedure (e .g. WSA order of 9 March 2011, VII SA/WA47/11; 
WSA in Warsaw order of 3 June 2011, VII SA/WA9/11). The Court stated in 
all those cases that administrative courts are not competent to deal with issues 
regulated by the Competition Act, mainly because of the features of antitrust 
proceedings being a ‘special’ administrative procedure (whereby SOKiK rules 
on complaints and appeals from the decisions of the UOKiK President). 
Regarding the letters from the UOKiK President, the Court claimed that 
they are no more than a piece of information on how the authority dealt with 
a given case (issue) and thus, they are not subject to (administrative) judicial 
review48. 
47 A cassation from this order was rejected by the Supreme Administrative Court by order 
of 12 July 2011, II GSK 1035/11.
48 The problem of the division of competences between civil and administrative courts is scru-
tinized by M. Błachucki, ‘Właściwość sądów administracyjnych i sądów powszechnych w spra wach 
antymonopolowych’ [‘Jurisdiction of administrative courts and civil courts in antitrust cases’] in: 
M. Błachucki, T. Górzyńska (eds.), Aktualne problemy rozgraniczenia właściwości sądów adminis-
tracyjnych i powszechnych [Current problems of delimitating jurisdiction of administrative and civil 
courts], Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny, Warszawa 2011, pp. 130–158.
VOL. 2012, 5(7)
KEY LEGISLATIVE AND JURISPRUDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS… 211
10.  Application of Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003 
by a national competition authority
In a judgment of 8 June 2011, III SK 2/09, the Supreme Court annulled 
a judgement of the Court of Appeals (judgment of 10 July 2008, VI ACa 
8/08) sustaining a SOKiK ruling which questioned a decision delivered by the 
UOKiK President on the discontinuation of antitrust proceedings concerning 
an infringement of Article 102 TFEU (previously Article 82 TEC) in relation 
to Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003. On the issue of a violation of the abuse 
prohibition on the basis of domestic law, the UOKiK President adopted 
a decision that no violation of the prohibition took place. Even if the final 
result of the decision based on EU law and the decision based on domestic 
law was the same (the undertaking was not declared to have abused its 
dominant position) the legal basis for the two decisions was different. The 
UOKiK President decided that a national competition authority (hereafter, 
NCA) had no power to adopt – on the basis of Article 5 Regulation 1/2003 
– a decision declaring that a given practice did not violate the prohibition 
contained in Article 102 TFEU. In order to rule on the appeal against the 
resulting judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court submitted 
preliminary questions to the Court of Justice about the competences of 
NCAs in this respects. Following the judgment of the Court of Justice of 
3 May 2011, C-375/0949, the Polish Supreme Court ruled that the UOKiK 
President did not have the competence to declare that a given undertaking 
had not committed an Article102 TFEU infringement. Still, the Court did not 
agree with the entirety of the NCA’s reasoning. It claimed that the key of this 
situation was not the lack of merit of the given proceedings, but the fact that 
issuing a decision on the non-violation of the Article 102 TFEU prohibition 
belonged to the exclusive competences of the Commission, even if the actual 
proceedings were conducted by an NCA. Article 5 tiret 3 of Regulation 1/2003 
should be applied directly, so if an NCA determines that the conditions of 
Article 102 TFEU are not met, it should decide that it has no grounds to act.
49 More on the preliminary judgment of the Court of Justice: K. Kowalik-Bańczyk, ‘Jednolite 
stosowanie unijnego prawa konkurencji jako ograniczenie dla autonomii proceduralnej kra-
jowych organów ochrony konkurencji – glosa do wyroku TS z dnia 3.05.2011 r. w sprawie 
C-375/09 Prezes UOKiK v. Tele 2 (obecnie Netia)’ [‘Uniform application of EU competition law 
as a restriction of the procedural autonomy of national competition protection authorities – 
commentary about CoJ judgment of 3 May 2011 in case C-375/09 Prezes UOKiK v. Tele 2 (now 
Netia)’] (2012) 2 Europejski Przegląd Sądowy 39-45; I. Szwedziak, ‘Is the parallel competence 
set out in Regulation 1/2003 totally clear? Case comment to the preliminary ruling of the Court 
of Justice of 3 May 2011 Tele 2 v President of Office of Competition and Consumer Protection 
(Case C-375/09)’ (2012) 5(7) YARS.
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